Discussion Theme 3/31: May Day & the General Strike

03/30/2012 in Education & Empowerment WG

SATURDAY MAY 31st from 3-4PM, Kellogg-Hubbard Library, East Montpelier Room

Join the Education and Empowerment WG for a discussion on the history and use of the General Strike and its’ connection to May Day. We’ll explore the ability of strikes to halt the capitalist system and win collective demands for working class people, as well as reasons why strikes and solidarity actions have become nearly impossible for today’s Labor Movement. Following Spain’s General Strike yesterday, we’ll discuss what it would take to revive the strike in the U.S. and the role of the Occupy Movement.

As background material, E&E has created a short primer. You can download and print them HERE (8.5×11) or HERE (11×17).

To read about Spain’s General Strike:

Feel free to post more links and resources as comments to this thread.

5 responses to Discussion Theme 3/31: May Day & the General Strike

  1. Brian said on 03/30/2012

    On Thursday, 3/29, people across Spain participated in a General Strike to protest the latest parliamentary vote on EU-imposed austerity measures. The Spanish newspaper El País reports 77 percent participation by workers throughout Spain, including 97 percent of industry, transport and construction employees. Several links with good background info. and photos are posted at http://www.social-ecology.org/2012/03/general-strike-in-spain/.

  2. Brian said on 03/30/2012

    A solidarity statement from Occupy Wall Street and the original CNT general strike call can be found at http://occupywallst.org/article/solidarity-todays-general-strike-spain/.

  3. http://monthlyreview.org/2012/03/01/reviving-the-strike-in-the-shadow-of-patco
    March, 2012, Monthly Review

    Reviving the Strike in the Shadow of PATCO
    By Steve Early

    Steve Early (lsupport [at] aol.com) is a longtime union activist and the author of Embedded With Organized Labor(Monthly Review Press, 2009) and The Civil Wars in U.S. Labor(Haymarket Books, 2011).
    Joseph McCartin, Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, the Air Traffic Controllers, and the Strike that Changed America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 504 pages, $29.95, hardback.

    Kim Voss and Irene Bloemraad, Rallying for Immigrant Rights: The Fight For Inclusion in 21st Century America(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 336 pages, $24.95, paperback.

    Joe Burns, Reviving the Strike: How Working People Can Regain Power and Transform America (Brooklyn: IG Publishing, 2011), 208 pages, $15.95, paperback.

    In the summer of 2011, labor unrest on both coasts provided a sharp rebuttal to the widely held view that the strike is dead (and buried) in the United States. Even as veterans of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) gathered in Florida to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of their historic defeat, a new generation of strikers was taking on big private-sector employers like Verizon and Kaiser Permanente. Last August, 45,000 Verizon workers walked out from Maine to Virginia in a high-profile struggle against contract concessions. One month later, they were joined by 20,000 nurses and other union members similarly opposed to pension and health care givebacks at Kaiser Permanente in California. Both of these struggles came right on the heels of last year’s biggest upsurge, the massive series of public employee demonstrations in Madison, Wisconsin that included strike activity by local high school teachers.

    Of course, in 2010, there were only eleven work stoppages, involving 1,000 workers or more, in the entire country. And the year before that, as PATCO historian Joe McCartin notes, the government reported only five major work stoppages involving a mere 13,000 workers in all—a tally roughly equal to the number of workers who walked off the job in a single, momentous strike on August 3, 1981. So, like the walkouts of 2011, these new books remind us what striking looks like, whether it fails or succeeds in a single union bargaining unit, or becomes part of a broader protest movement.

    A professor at Georgetown University, McCartin describes what happened when a tightly knit union brotherhood (there were only a few female air traffic controllers in 1981) assumed, mistakenly, that it was irreplaceable. President Ronald Reagan’s retaliatory firing of 11,345 PATCO members cast a long shadow over collective bargaining in the United States, and provided inspiration for the more recent union busting activities by Wisconsin governor Scott Walker and others. PATCO’s destruction ushered in a decade of lost strikes and lock outs, triggered by management demands for pay and benefit givebacks. Given renewed momentum by our latest recession, this concession bargaining trend continues unabated today, in both the private and public sector.

    Nevertheless, just twenty-five years after PATCO lost, hundreds of thousands of foreign-born workers participated in political strike activity on a scale rarely seen in the United States, even in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Their “rallying for immigrant rights,” as sociologists Kim Voss and Irene Bloemraad call it in their edited collection, took the form of successive one-day protests, culminating in a massive work stay-away on May 1, 2006. Both union members and an even larger number of non-union workers took to the streets in major cities across the country, along with their family members and community supporters, to protest Republican legislation that would have made it a federal crime to live in the United States illegally. Known as the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act, this bill was adopted by the House but died in the Senate thanks, in large part, to the grassroots movement against it.

    It is left to Joe Burns, a labor lawyer and longtime union activist in Minneapolis, to imagine how the bitter lessons of past defeats—and inspiring examples of community-labor solidarity (like the immigrant worker protests six years ago)—can become the basis for “reviving the strike.” In his highly readable call to action, Burns says that American unions must regain the will and ability to strike, or they face further withering away. Burns argues that:

    If the labor movement is to rise again, it will not be as result of electing different politicians, the passage of legislation, or improved methods of union organizing. Rather, workers will need to rediscover the power of the strike. Not the ineffectual strike of today, where employees sit on picket lines waiting for scabs to take their jobs, but the type of strike capable of grinding industries to a halt—the kind employed in the first half of the twentieth century.

    As McCartin recounts in Collision Course, the groundwork for PATCO’s fight-to-the-death with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was laid by changes in the system of federal employee labor relations in the early 1960s. After several false starts, the controllers were able to create a real union to replace an ineffectual, management-dominated professional association. PATCO’s emergence was part of “the largest surge in unionization since the emergence of industrial unions in the 1930s. By 1967, teachers, social workers, fire fighters, police officers, sanitation workers, and others were raising a cry for ‘trade union rights to public employees NOW!’” Like state, county, and municipal workers in many parts of the United States, air traffic controllers ended up with the ability to negotiate about some employment conditions, but without any legally sanctioned right to strike.

    Nevertheless, PATCO members engaged in series of militant job actions, including slowdowns, sick outs, and work-to-rule actions, that helped build their new organization and gave them confidence in its muscle. When PATCO walked out in 1981, its leaders firmly believed that the airline industry would, indeed, grind to a halt. The union’s previous (albeit smaller-scale) confrontations with the federal government had ended favorably, leading the controllers to conclude that the results would be the same, with no greater risk to themselves. Between 1962 and 1981, there were thirty-nine recorded work stoppages by all types of federal employees; as McCartin notes, “in only eight were any strikers discharged and, in those cases, firings were targeted, not imposed in blanket fashion.”

    Nine months earlier, PATCO had endorsed Ronald Reagan’s presidential candidacy, believing that he would be more controller-friendly than Democrat Jimmy Carter. PATCO strategists were “sure Reagan would not fire more than ten thousand skilled specialists that the government had spent hundreds of millions of dollars and many years to train—not when they were seeking only improved working conditions and fair compensation after years of seeing their salaries lag behind inflation, and when dismissing them would ultimately be far more costly than meeting their demands.” But, after giving them forty-eight hours to return, the former California governor (and one-time leader of the Screen Actors Guild) did dismiss the FAA employees who struck illegally at 400 airports and air traffic control centers. They were soon replaced by 800 military and 8,900 civilian controllers (supervisors, picket line crossers, and new hires), a cobbled-together workforce that cost taxpayers $2 billion to recruit, train, and deploy. Commercial aircraft continued to fly despite a post-strike FAA staffing shortage that persisted for years.

    An Existential Threat

    Neither the AFL-CIO, nor, more importantly, other airline industry unions displayed the kind of strike solidarity necessary to meet Reagan’s existential threat. PATCO’s most significant aid came from abroad, in the form of a two-day boycott by Canadian air traffic controllers; they risked disciplinary action for refusing to handle flights to or from the United States, until, under government pressure, their union lifted the ban. Meanwhile, top U.S. labor officials, from right to left, dithered about what to do, ultimately leaving it up to individual unions to decide. (The Carpenters did not even disinvite Reagan as a speaker at their national convention one month after he fired the controllers. His speech, defending his actions, also failed to elicit any boos; instead, union delegates “sat respectfully if uncomfortably through his remarks.”)

    Per usual, Lane Kirkland, the conservative Cold Warrior then heading the AFL-CIO, found lots of reasons for inaction. Among them, “PATCO had not warned or consulted the AFL-CIO,” which was preoccupied at the time with plans for “a massive September 19 ‘Solidarity Day’ march on Washington in protest of Reagan’s social and economic policies and program cuts.” International Association of Machinists (IAM) president William Winpisinger, “an avowed socialist known for his fiery rhetoric,” lectured his Executive Council colleagues about the need to resist Reagan. But Wimpy, as he was nicknamed, “stopped noticeably short of saying he was ready to pull machinists off their jobs.” McCartin quotes a federal transportation official as saying that, if IAM-represented airline mechanics and baggage handlers had respected PATCO picket lines, “we couldn’t have withstood it. It would have closed every single airport.”

    The president of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), also turned his back on PATCO, leaving other AFL-CIO Council members to conclude, privately, that the controllers’ walk out was a “no-win situation” created by “botched negotiations.” J.J. O’Donnell, then president of ALPA, publicly declared that the post-strike skies were safe. His own union’s safety committee disagreed and its findings, if backed by ALPA, could have been the basis for more individual pilots refusing to fly. In 1982, after being voted out of office, O’Donnell was named to a top Labor Department post by Reagan. In contrast, PATCO strikers remained under a lifetime presidential ban from federal employment as controllers until 1993, when the Clinton Administration finally allowed a small trickle of them to return to their old jobs.

    The strikers themselves were unlikely martyrs to labor’s cause. The vast majority, as McCartin points out, were “suburban dwelling military veterans” who went directly from the service into the rigid, hierarchical culture of the FAA. “Although they were breaking federal law in an unprecedented effort to shut down the nation’s air travel, they were hardly radicals,” as demonstrated by PATCO’s ill-fated endorsement of Reagan. Internally, they were extremely well-organized and disciplined, with an elaborate, military-style blueprint for their work stoppage that contrasted sharply with the far-sketchier strike plans of other unions, before or since. Providing fascinating detail that is typical of his exhaustively researched book, McCartin reports that:

    In April 1980, PATCO distributed a fifty-five page strike planning booklet to members. In the months that followed, the union prepared as though it was going to war. Strike planners developed ‘clusters’ of locals that could coordinate their activity during the anticipated strike, independent of national direction should PATCO’s leaders be arrested. Clusters had established secret ‘safe houses’ from which local strike efforts could be directed in the event that union headquarters were raided. Strike planners urged local clusters to set up decentralized calling trees to pass information and recommended that members use phone booths or friends phones when communicating vital strike information.

    But systematic internal preparation was not supplemented by pre-strike outreach to other potential allies. In this regard, breaking ranks with the rest of organized labor in the 1980 presidential race was not the controllers’ only pre-strike mistake. PATCO members also failed to build cross-union ties with the pilots, mechanics, flight attendants, and baggage handlers whose backing was desperately needed when push came to shove. According to McCartin, the pilots in particular viewed the walk out as “a threat to their livelihoods” because of the thousands of furloughs it would produce.

    The Reagan administration, on the other hand, “knew that winning the cooperation of major airlines was essential” to withstanding the pressure of a strike in a period of rising fuel prices, deepening recession, excess capacity, and other “ongoing turbulence unleashed by the 1978 airline deregulation act.” The FAA’s strike contingency plan was sold to the Air Transport Association, the national trade group for carriers, as “a way for airlines to shed their least profitable routes without fear of aiding their competitors.” The ATA’s “staunch support was a crucial component of PATCO’s defeat,” McCartin concludes. PATCO’s subsequent bankruptcy and decertification, in turn, strengthened the hand of airline management in its own future showdowns with ALPA, the IAM, the Flight Attendants, and other unions at Continental Airlines, Eastern, TWA, and Northwest.

    Nevertheless, as court injunctions, $32 million in fines, and criminal indictments (against seventy-eight strike leaders) piled up around the country, the PATCO strike became a labor cause célèbre. As McCartin notes, “many activists were angry with their national leaders for failing to do more for PATCO.” At the local level, there was a tremendous outpouring of support for the strikers, despite media vilification of their contract demands as greedy, irrational, and “unpatriotic.” Viewed from the perspective of the last three decades—with its real-wage stagnation, longer working hours, and shrinking pensions—PATCO’s proposals do seem “unrealistic” today. But that is a sad commentary on how far union bargaining has gone in the wrong direction, and how worker expectations have been lowered in the process.

    Thirty-one-years ago, the stressful working conditions in air traffic control, that adversely affected FAA employees’ health and longevity on the job, led PATCO negotiators to seek a shorter work week (equal to the reduced hours of controllers in other countries) and better early-retirement benefits. Today, in many industries, early retirement is under assault, curbs on mandatory overtime have been weakened, and exhausting twelve-hour shifts have become the norm. Campaigns for reduced work time are few and far between, in the United States at least. At the FAA, modern-day controllers have been skirmishing with management about the problem of safety errors made as a result of sleep deprivation. Once again, they have union representation; in 1987, striker replacements and others hired, post-strike, formed the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) and won a union certification ballot, even before Reagan left office.

    A “Day Without Immigrants”

    If air traffic controllers, circa 1981, were unfairly depicted (and sometimes publicly resented) as an over-privileged group of “labor aristocrats,” it was pretty hard to make the same claim about the foreign-born workers who rose up, so unexpectedly and impressively, in 2006. Twelve-million strong, these undocumented immigrants did not have to stop work to break the law; under U.S. immigration rules, it is “illegal” for them to be working! (For the best political critique of that problematic conceptualization of their status, see David Bacon’sIllegal People: How Globalization Creates Migration and Criminalizes Immigrants.) The draconian legislation pushed by right-wing Republican Congressman James Sensenbrenner in 2005–6 had a galvanizing effect on recent immigrants because it threatened to make their already precarious employment situation here even worse. Kim Voss and Irene Bloemraad, the editors of Rallying for Immigrant Rights, estimate that 3.7 to 5 million people joined the escalating protests held in March, April, and May 2006 in 160 cities. On May Day that year, as many as 700,000 marched in Chicago and Los Angeles, where taking off from work to participate in the “Day Without Immigrants” was most widespread. A New York Times report the next day, cited by Burns, vividly describes the impact in predominantly non-union workplaces:

    Lettuce, tomatoes and grapes went unpicked in fields in California and Arizona, which contribute more than half the nation’s produce, as scores of growers let workers take the day off. Truckers who move 70 percent of the goods in ports in Los Angeles and Long Beach, Calif. did not work. Meatpacking companies, including Tyson Foods and Cargill, closed plants in the Midwest and the West, employing more than 20,000 people, while the flower and produce markets in downtown Los Angeles stood largely and eerily empty.

    What Voss and Bloemraad call the “fight for inclusion in 21st century America” could not have been waged so effectively without prior grassroots work by national and local coalitions composed of unions, the religious community, and immigrant rights organizations. In his contribution to their collection, Bay Area community organizer and housing lawyer Randy Shaw credits the Immigrant Workers Freedom Ride (IWFR) as an important antecedent. Organized by UNITE HERE, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), and the AFL-CIO three years before, “the IWFR largely escaped national consciousness at the time, but it played a critical role in reenergizing and broadening America’s immigrant rights movement, setting the stage for the mass marches of 2006.”

    The editors, joined by political science professor Taeku Lee, describe how the defeat of Sensenbrenner’s bill in the Senate did not translate into further progress for advocates of immigrant rights, however. Groups pushing for more restrictive immigration policies simply shifted their focus from Congress to the states, first under George Bush and now under Barack Obama. In the wake of the protests, there were continuing workplace raids by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents. There was also a sharp increase in the number of deportations in 2007 and 2008. More undocumented workers rounded up by ICE were also charged with felony violations of identity theft and forgery laws. Now, under the not-much-kinder-or-gentler Obama Administration, the use of no-match letters has become the enforcement tactic of choice, triggering large-scale workplace purges by low-wage employers across the country. All of this has “had a chilling effect,” Voss, Bloemraad, and Lee argue.

    In addition, “the type of organizations that initially facilitated the protests” contributed, in various ways, to “the rapid demobilization of the movement following spring, 2006.”

    For some organizations, such as schools, churches, hometown associations, and the ethnic media, protest activity is peripheral to their primary mission and thus they are poorly equipped to support a long-term social movement for immigrant rights. The organizations that were of a type that might sustain a movement, tended to be smaller, with limited funding. While such organizations continue their activities into the present, the immigrant rights movement also has, like many other social movements, been divided by strong internal disagreement about tactics and goals….

    For their part, the two unions most supportive of the foreign-born—SEIU and UNITE HERE—fell out among themselves in 2009–10, moving from “strong internal disagreement” (about issues unrelated to immigration) to public feuding over national union funds, jurisdiction, and membership. As I recounted in The Civil Wars in U.S. Labor (see Jon Flanders’s review inMonthly Review, May 2011), this internecine conflict proved to be a costly distraction from grassroots campaigning for health care and labor law reform during Obama’s first two years in office; it was also no boon to immigration reform, a cause with almost as many political enemies as the Employee Free Choice Act.

    Rebuilding Strike Capacity

    In his book, Burns praises the more freewheeling “social movement” character of the immigrant-worker upsurge six years ago and its middle-American counterpart in Wisconsin last year. “Reviving solidarity requires new approaches to unionism based not on workers focusing on narrow battles with individual employers but, rather, on fighting for larger issues and causes,” Burns argues. He notes that, in France, “workers respond to attempts to eliminate social programs not through letter or email campaigns to politicians, but through direct action involving millions of workers,” struggles that look more like the “Day Without Immigrants” or the anti-Walker mobilization in Wisconsin than conventional union walk outs.

    One big obstacle to the latter, and a major reason that strike activity has shrunk statistically, is the legal straightjacket imposed on U.S. labor. As Burns documents well, the most effective strike tactics and forms of workplace solidarity have been effectively outlawed in the private sector, by legislative fiat and/or court decision. The high-water mark of labor efforts to restrict the debilitating use of permanent replacements in private sector strikes occurred nearly two decades ago during the Clinton Administration. Introduced in 1993 as the “Striker Replacement Act” (and later renamed the “Worker Fairness Act”), this legislation was quickly passed in the Democrat-controlled House, but blocked in the Senate by a Republican filibuster. When labor law reform was revived in 2007–10, in the form of the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), the continuing problem of striker replacements was not even addressed for fear of arousing even greater conservative opposition.

    Meanwhile, in government employment, only a small number of workers are permitted to strike legally. Public workers who ignore strike bans risk paying a heavy financial price, as PATCO members did thirty years ago and New York City transit workers did after their work stoppage in 2005 (for which they were heavily fined, individually and organizationally, and their union was stripped of its ability to collect dues via payroll check off). The recent attacks on public sector collective bargaining in the Midwest, where unions have been fairly well entrenched, has reframed the workers’ rights debate even more narrowly. Today, unions are fighting for the mere existence of contract negotiations and against bipartisan legislative attempts to limit the scope of bargaining with state, county, or municipal agencies. In mainstream union circles, strengthening the right of teachers or state workers to strike has become as unthinkable as repealing the Taft-Hartley Act.

    Taft-Hartley’s restrictions on secondary strikes and boycotts—that would make primary walk outs more effective—are backed up by provisions that subject unions to employer damage suits and fines. For example, the United Mine Workers (UMW) racked up $64 million worth during its 1989 contract dispute at Pittston, which featured a rare plant occupation. The UMW contract campaign at Pittston is among those cited by Burns as a successful example of “membership mobilization and a refusal to play by the rules that favor management.” Using such case studies, and a mixture of historical and political arguments, Burns seeks to dispel what McCartin calls the “dispiriting psychological impact” that labor’s poor won-lost record, in major strikes, has had on members and leaders alike.

    Reviving the Strike is thus a provocative, well-argued, and much-needed polemic. Burns bravely takes fellow labor progressives to task for being too adaptive to the “new conservative reality” facing unions today. He chides proponents of “social unionism” whose organizing, bargaining, and coalition-building strategies have “functioned comfortably within the existing structures imposed by management and the legal system.” My only quibble with the author’s approach is a tendency to idealize some open-ended strikes or lock outs that settled into siege warfare and ultimately did not end well for the union side. Heroic struggles like the Hormel strike in the 1980s or the Staley lock out in the 1990s certainly raised worker consciousness, and even radicalized some participants. However, there is no getting around their tragic denouement, aided and abetted in both cases by national union hostility and treachery.

    Burn’s useful, if overly brief, discussion of “quickie” or intermittent strikes may be more persuasive and relevant to the situation of unions seeking to reduce the cost and risk of walking out, without abandoning that strategy altogether, as too many have done by not even maintaining adequate strike funds. A lawyer and negotiator for the Association of Flight Attendants (an affiliate of the Communications Workers of America), Burns describes how their members developed a contract campaign and selective strike plan called CHAOS (Creating Havoc Around Our System). This was a response to the failed full-scale airline worker walk outs of the 1980s and involved the threatened use of intermittent job actions directed at individual flights. While legally entangling in other ways, the Railway Labor Act that governs airline industry labor relations is less restrictive in this area so, “unlike in other industries, CHAOS can inflict major economic harm upon an employer” while minimizing flight attendant exposure to management retaliation.

    The fundamental lesson of all these books is as old as unions themselves: an injury to one is an injury to all. No labor movement can long survive, much less thrive, without a strong culture of mutual aid and protection, that facilitates, when necessary, the withdrawal of labor from the production of goods or providing of services. When labor organizations practice solidarity some of the time, rather than all of the time, they do a grave disservice to their own members. And they also contribute to the worsening of employment conditions for the working class majority which lacks even the limited job clout of the union-represented.

  4. Was a general strike possible in Madison, WI a year ago during the uprising? Comments from Dan LaBotz meeting with worker activists there after the protests were dying down as people turned to an electoral recall campaign as the more familiar way to resist:
    Were People Ready to Strike?

    · *It was reported by a couple of people, based on conversations with a member of the labor council, that when the question of a general strike was raised in the labor council the leaders immediately said, “We’ll be arrested.” And, “They’ll take our treasuries.” (Presumably through lawsuits.) The council turned toward the protests and the recall effort.

    · *One male AFSCME member said that “people were definitely not ready for strike.” He argued that talk of strikes or even a general strike had frightened AFSCME members who were afraid for their jobs. (A long time university employee, he was definitely the most cautious activist there, but very well informed and thoughtful.)

    · *Another AFSCME member said “there was not that level of support from the ranks.”

    · *A labor educator from the School for Workers said, “People were not ready for a general strike and if a general strike had been attempted it would have led to a demoralizing defeat.”

    · *Kevin Sherry of the Firefighters said that when he went to his members and said, “Well, do we want to join a general strike,” they began to say things like “What about my house? What about my car?” They were not ready to strike.

    Where are we now?

    · *Two women factory workers from the John Deere plant in Horicon, Wisconsin, each of them married to a public employee (firefighter and correctional facility worker) told me that their IAM union leaders supported the public employees, but that the factory workers didn’t care about them. Their coworkers did not identify with the movement and did not think it had anything to do with them. They did not see the danger of future “right to work” laws coming down the pike.

    · *One male AFSCME member, the same one mentioned above who said people were “not ready to strike” explained angrily that he has taken an 8 percent wage cut and has no union rights anymore.

    · *One male AFSCME member who works for the state told me that many AFSCME members just want it to be over. They are tired of waiting for the court decision. They don’t like it but feel, “What can we do about it?”

    · * One woman teacher said during a workshop that most teachers seemed to be withdrawing and “going back into their bubbles,” but she was determined not to let them by finding some activity for them “in their comfort zone.”

    · *One person said, that since things were now focused on the recall that the Democrats have “taken it over” because “they have that sort of organization” (politics).
    … My own feeling is that the question of whether or not a strike was possible during the critical week cannot be based on these retrospective accounts because people immediately lose the sense of the dynamic. I believe that if a key group had moved, it might have been possible. But the Firefighters and the Teachers did not have a leadership prepared to challenge their members to take action.

  5. Ontario’s ‘Days of Action’ – A Citywide Political Strike Offers A Potential Example for Madison
    Dan La Botz March 10, 2011

    With events in Madison unfolding by the hour, we are reposting the story of the Ontario “Days of Action” to offer practical advice for mounting huge strikes and demonstrations. In the late ’90s, unions in Ontario, Canada, conducted 11 citywide strikes against the Conservative government’s policies. The strikes featured cross-picketing in each other’s workplaces and broad labor-community coalitions.

    Unlike most strikes, political strikes are aimed not at management but at the government. A political strike is an attempt to force the government to change some policy, or even part of a broader attempt to change the government itself. In the United States, political strikes have been rare, usually against one city government. For example, after police attacked workers during a post-World War II organizing drive among retail clerks in Oakland, 142 AFL unions and 100,000 workers declared a “work holiday,” walked off their jobs, and shut the city down. After a compromise settlement, the unions ran a political campaign and in the next election won office for four out of five of their city council candidates.

    Sometimes the scope is wider than a single city. In the 1960s, West Virginia coal miners struck to pressure the government to pass legislation dealing with black lung. From the 1950s through the 1970s, public employees and teachers in many states called illegal strikes to win collective bargaining laws for public employees. The United Farm Workers used strikes to pressure the state of California to pass a collective bargaining law for agricultural workers.

    In countries with more militant labor traditions, political strikes have occurred more often. During the 1970s and 1980s, Brazilian workers used political strikes to help overthrow a military dictatorship. South African workers used political strikes to fight the apartheid government. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Latin American unions in over a dozen countries engaged in national general strikes against privatization, free trade agreements, and the effects of globalization.

    Political strikes are often met with government repression. When Polish workers’ national strikes threatened to overthrow the Communist government there in 1980, the Polish military suppressed the movement. Political strikes can clearly be powerful weapons, but when they become national movements in which workers challenge the government, the stakes are high on both sides.

    Between late 1995 and 1998, Ontario unions called eleven “Days of Action” that were, in effect, political strikes against the provincial Conservative government of Mike Harris. The Days of Action were a series of rolling, one-day general strikes in different towns and cites, involving not only unions but also many social movements and community organizations.

    Eventually Ontario’s unions called hundreds of thousands of workers into the streets, shutting down many private businesses and public agencies, while also holding mass demonstrations and rallies throughout the province. While they did not succeed in bringing down the Conservative government, the strikes did challenge the Conservatives’ anti-worker onslaught, and they helped develop a new group of labor and community activists.

    The Days of Action were the unions’ response to a government assault on workers and the poor. Mike Harris was elected on June 8, 1995 on a platform he called “the Common Sense Revolution,” inspired by Ronald Reagan’s conservative policies. As the Canadian Broadcasting Company reported, Harris “…cut taxes, reduced the size of government in the province, cracked down on welfare, encouraged work-for-welfare programs, merged school boards….” He became notorious for his tough talk and attacks on the poor; for example, his government eliminated a $37-a-month benefit for pregnant welfare recipients, “with Harris explaining he wanted to make sure ‘those dollars don’t go to beer.'”1

    Rick Witherspoon, now a Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) official, was president of the London and District Labour Council at the time. “Harris first attacked the poor by rolling back social assistance,” says Witherspoon. “Then he turned his attention to workers and put in place some of the most regressive labor legislation we had seen in decades. He repealed anti-scab legislation, froze the minimum wage, amended health and safety legislation, and made it harder for injured workers to get workers’ compensation. Then he turned his sights on public sector workers by challenging their ability to bargain collective agreements. It was very clear that his agenda was to support big business and attack the rights of workers.”

    René Fortin, assistant to the regional director of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), remembers “Bill 136, which removed anti-scab laws that had been introduced by the New Democratic Party [the labor-backed party]. They were proposing a whole slew of issues dealing with employment standards, things like the legal hours of work per week.

    “They were making proposals about privatization. They were talking about removing the right to strike in some areas. Or in areas where we did not have the right to strike (such as hospitals) but had arbitration, they were talking about getting rid of mutually agreed-upon arbitrators and having government-appointed arbitrators.”

    The Canadian labor movement was not united as it began to develop a response to the Harris government. When the previous, labor-backed New Democratic Party (NDP) government had cut budgets for social programs and attacked the bargaining rights of provincial public sector workers, unions were divided on how to respond. The public employee unions–including CUPE, Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC), Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW), and Ontario Secondary School Teachers’ Federation (OSSTF)–had wanted to fight back, and, along with the CAW, Hotel Employees (HERE), and UNITE, they began to question their relationship with the NDP.

    However, most of the industrial unions wanted to maintain unquestioning support for the party. At a meeting of union leaders, a group of unions (principally the United Food and Commercial Workers, Communications, Energy and Paperworkers, Service Employees, Machinists, National Union of Public and General Employees, Steelworkers, and Teamsters) issued a statement–printed on pink paper–that called for renewed support to the NDP. The so-called “pink paper unions” also made a veiled critique of the role of the public sector unions, and threatened to split the Ontario Federation of Labor. The “pink paper” divisions still existed when Harris came to power.

    Nevertheless, Canadian unions found enough unity to launch the Days of Action, but with different emphases. For example, while the general slogan of the province-wide Toronto Days of Action was “Organize, Educate, and Resist,” the slogan of the Canadian section of the Steelworkers was “Organize, Educate, Legislate” (though in the city of Toronto, the Steelworkers aligned themselves with the more militant public employee unions).

    We look here at the Days of Action in two Ontario cities: first, the conservative, medium-sized city of London; second, Toronto, Canada’s largest and most diverse city.

    Despite the differences among Ontario’s unions, all had a strong reaction against the Harris government. Virtually all began to lobby against the Harris government’s program and to educate their members about it. They lobbied municipal councils and got many of them to pass resolutions opposing the federal government’s budget cuts, which would have a disastrous effect on many city services and programs.

    CUPE’s leadership called for meetings with local union leaders to discuss the political situation and to raise the idea of a general strike. “At that time, CUPE represented about 200,000 members in Ontario, organized in 800 locals with 2,000 collective bargaining agreements,” explains René Fortin. “We held a series of consultations with the local leadership, which culminated in massive conferences throughout Ontario in which direction was given by the local leadership. In every community or concentration of membership, we called leadership meetings and then membership meetings. We went around obtaining strike votes aimed at a general strike for the withdrawal of all public services in the provinces.

    ‘We had to do that,” Fortin continues, “because we have local autonomy. We’re not centralized by any sense of the imagination, and in terms of going on strike, those decisions are made by vote.

    “We reached out to other labor groups, both those in the Canadian Labour Congress and those outside the CLC. We also attempted to bring into the fold the industrial unions, which were hesitant. CAW was up front with us, but the Steelworkers and other industrial unions were reticent, and we were trying to win them over.”

    Union officials and activists realized that the first group they had to reach was their own membership. Herman Rosenfeld, a national representative in the CAW Education Department, says, “A lot of auto workers and other workers had voted for Harris. Even many public sector workers had voted for him. One of the key thrusts was to change people’s opinion. We had to convince people that they should oppose Harris, strike their employers, and participate in the Days of Action.”

    So the CAW and a number of other unions mobilized to talk to the members. Rosenfeld remembers, “We took a group of political activists from the unions–some lower-level elected officials and other rank and filers–and paid them to work as organizers. We set up meetings in union halls, or informally in bars and donut shops. We produced leaflets and materials specifically targeted to the workers in the workplaces in the community, zeroing in on issues that we knew would touch a chord with them. They were handed out in union meetings, informal meetings, and inside workplaces. We encouraged activists and local union officials inside workplaces to talk to co-workers, and suggested tactics for them to do this. This was a planned component of building the Days of Action in each of the target cities. While most of the meetings were with small numbers of people, they eventually involved thousands of workers.

    “Many of the workers had supported Harris because he talked about cutting taxes. We challenged them on this issue. We argued that most of the tax cuts would go to his rich friends. We pointed out that he was cutting the number of health and safety inspectors in the workplace, and cutting workers’ compensation. We told them, ultimately you will pay for this in terms of your own health.

    “We pointed out that the cuts to social assistance were so vicious–along with the end of funding to social housing–that people were being forced into hostels and motels. The government was threatening to bring in workfare, which would force social service recipients–workers who had exhausted their unemployment insurance benefits–to work for their benefits. The government had threatened to use them as low-wage replacements for jobs being cut from government agencies, and even as potential scabs.

    “London was the model, but we did this in several cities. We had a pretty intense period of talking to people about these things. Where we did this we had the best results.

    “We didn’t know if we could pull this off, but we did, and it worked brilliantly. Not everyone was convinced, but we convinced many. Other workers often supported it even if they were not convinced, because they were loyal to the union.”

    The goal was to mobilize members against their employers, to pressure Harris to withdraw his policies. The challenge of bringing down the Conservative government and forcing a parliamentary election for a new provincial premier and cabinet would be a long shot–and could occur only if the strategy of one-day general strikes could breach the divide between unions. Certainly, the most militant groups of worker activists sought to build towards a more massive movement to get rid of Harris’s government, but that presupposed a number of other things happening. The goals from the point of view of the overall union movement were to change workers’ and community members’ opinions, to mobilize them against employers and the government, and to pressure the government to withdraw its policies.

    However, union leaders were clear from the beginning that a general strike could not be organized by the union movement alone. It would also need allies among the social movements and community organizations. “Because the legislation also meant cutbacks in services, it was a frontal attack on the working poor, and those on welfare,” Fortin explains. The next step was bringing the unions and community groups together.

    “We called for meetings with community groups in each area. We were reaching out to church groups, anti-poverty groups, organizations dealing with social services and their recipients.”

    The next step was to set up coalitions in every city and town. “The Ontario Federation of Labor was coordinating the Days of Action and they began to focus on different towns,” says Fortin. “In each town where the Days of Action were to take place, there was a community co-chair and a labor co-chair. That was the structure, and there had to be complete buy-in from all parties in terms of roles and direction.”

    Working with the community groups wasn’t always easy for union activists. “Those that hadn’t worked previously with community groups found it difficult to work with them because of the organizational approach,” says Fortin. “The labor movement style is, ‘let’s have a vote and deal with it, let’s have a vote and go.’ The community groups had a different style based on consensus; they don’t always take votes. They say, ‘this is the approach we would like to take.’ Our members wanted to say, ‘let’s cut the debate and take a vote,’ so the debates took longer. We had to find a common solution, and then take a vote.

    “Another issue is that there was a degree of suspicion as to the motives of the union,” Fortin adds. “The typical question was, ‘Where are you going to be after this?’ For years, community groups had come to the labor movement and sometimes they had had a solid reception and in other cases not. For some union members it was just bizarre dealing with other organizations that weren’t part of the union movement. Certainly there were hiccups on occasion, but we dealt with them.”

    The process—labor leadership meetings, rank-and-file member meetings, meetings between union activists and community activists—was repeated in one town after another. Out of these came the common understanding that made possible cooperation in common actions.

    The Ontario Federation of Labor decided that the first Day of Action should occur in the conservative city of London. Rick Witherspoon explains, “To take this challenge to the streets, they didn’t really want to go to a town like Windsor or Oshawa, which are real union towns. The union leadership felt that if they focused on a conservative (small ‘c’) town, the impact would be greater.

    “Nothing like this had ever happened on this scale in Ontario. It was a formidable task to ramp it up. As it did throughout Ontario, the labour council decided to create two co-chairs, one from the private sector unions and one from the public sector.” Witherspoon was president of a CAW Ford local and represented the private sector.

    “We believed that if we wanted to challenge the business community that supported the administration’s agenda, then we had to get to their wallets. Shutting down as many businesses as possible would get their attention,” says Witherspoon.

    “To solicit support, we held membership meetings for almost every union affiliated with the labour council in London. We also involved many of our London community partners, social action groups, church groups. It became very clear this wasn’t just about the labor movement; it was about the kinds of communities we wanted to live in and the impact the conservative agenda was having on our communities.”

    Because the government viewed the Days of Action as illegal, and because workers would shut down their workplaces, union officials were initially worried about repercussions. In both the public and private sectors, contracts contained no-strike clauses. “Partly for this reason, we didn’t call it a strike, we called it a Day of Action,” says Witherspoon. “Many employers threatened their workers that they could face discipline up to and including dismissal.” But the unions decided to go ahead.

    In London, the unions took their fight into the public arena. Although they didn’t always win, it was a useful educational and organizing process. “When we approached the London City Council and asked them to adopt a resolution supporting the Day of Action, they rejected it,” Witherspoon says. “The Council said that that they expected all municipal employees to report for work. We brought many employees to the city council meeting, and it was an interesting debate. It was interesting partly because the Day of Action was planned for December 11, 1995, and a council meeting was scheduled for that day. In their wisdom, the council changed their next meeting date to avoid being confronted by picketers.”

    At the same time, Witherspoon says it was clear to the organizers that “there was good support both within the unions and the community, and the Day of Action started to take on a life of its own.” Unions from other parts of the province pledged to supply support–workers to make phone calls and work on schedules for picketing. The unions recruited marshals and organized buses to bring people to London.

    “To protect workers who would not be reporting to work but to keep them involved in the action,” says Witherspoon, “we developed a strategy called ‘cross-picketing.’ Rather than put a Ford worker at risk picketing his own plant, we would have workers from other plants picket the Ford plant and have Ford workers picket other plants.” Thus, any worker who did try to go to work on the Day of Action would be confronted with a picket line, but management would not see its own employees in front of the plant. Social movements were equally crucial, as they appealed to their members and the wider communities to help cross-picket various workplaces.

    When organizers met with the London police, for the most part they were cooperative. “However,” Witherspoon remembers, “one day when we met with the police, it had been announced that for all demonstrators in the march the CAW would supply balaclavas, which are knitted masks, usually used by skiers, that cover the lower part of the face. This was a problem from the police point of view because people couldn’t be identified, and they went a little ballistic in the meeting. We assured them they were just toques (simple knitted caps) and not balaclavas. In fact, they were balaclavas, though we didn’t know that at the time. Still, it was good to have the balaclavas, because December 11 was one of the coldest days on record that winter.”

    In meetings, the organizers explained what would happen, emphasizing that they were planning a peaceful day of picketing and a rally. “We impressed on everybody that this was intended to be peaceful, and that’s how we were able to sell it to the police. We created hundreds of marshals, and got the police to agree that before they reacted to a situation they would ask a marshal to handle the problem.

    “On the Day of Action, two parades started in different locations, one in the center and one in the east end. The police closed off all the streets, and the two parades converged in the downtown area for the rally,” says Witherspoon.

    “On December 11, we began picketing at midnight to make sure that people who would have gone in for the midnight shift would face pickets, so they could either go home or join the protest,” Witherspoon remembers. “There were also pickets at all locations at 6:30 in the morning and then again in the afternoon. “There was picketing at hundreds of locations: at manufacturing plants, office buildings, municipal offices, and the airport. The locations that we focused on were shut down. At the Ford and GM plants, which together employed between 7,000 and 8,000 people, there was no production for 24 hours. The Labatt’s brewery shut down and didn’t make any beer that day. The Kellogg plant didn’t make any cereal. The buses in the city didn’t move that day. Before the day many of the schools and government offices had agreed to close down, knowing that it wasn’t going to be business as usual.”

    Although they shut down the city, the unions made sure that essential services were provided. “We didn’t put people’s health at risk,” says Witherspoon. The teachers’ unions put on educational events for the students and parents, and parents and children supported the picketing at the schools.

    The London Day of Action proved a tremendous success. “We probably had 20,000 people on the streets in London that day, the largest demonstration and rally that had ever taken place in that community,” says Witherspoon. “We succeeded in closing down the workplaces we had targeted. We had more media than this city had ever seen for any event. It was truly national coverage, even international. There were letters of support from people from Canada and the United States, as well as outside North America.”

    Witherspoon doesn’t hesitate when asked to name the most important part of the Days of Action: “That we took the opportunity to educate our leadership, our members, and the community about the reasons for this action. If we had not taken time to educate everybody, it would not have been as successful as it was.

    “What led to our success was the fact that we involved as many unions as we could and included our community partners, so it wasn’t just the labor movement challenging the government. It was the community challenging the government. The coalitions formed then still exist today. There was a new respect among groups in the community. People who didn’t understand each other before now had a better understanding. We learned that being inclusive was one of the keys to success. When we put together committees, we made sure they were as inclusive as possible, that people really did have a sense of ownership in the actions we were taking.”

    The city of Hamilton followed with the next Day of Action in February 1996, with the participation of 120,000 people. In April 1996, about 30,000 participated in the three neighboring cities of Cambridge, Kitchener, and Waterloo. In June 1996, in a somewhat smaller city, Peterborough, some 10,000 participated. In Toronto, in October 1996, the Day of Action mobilized what is said to have been the biggest demonstration in Ontario’s history, with at least 250,000 people.

    Organizing a general strike in Toronto was an enormous undertaking. In 1996 Toronto had a population of about 2.5 million in the municipality and 4.2 million in the total metropolitan area. While Ottawa is Canada’s political capital, Toronto is the country’s corporate and financial capital, filled with corporate headquarters.

    We look at the Days of Action in Toronto from two perspectives. Helen Kennedy was involved in organizing a labor-community coalition in a local community, while René Fortin had responsibility in the organization of the citywide strike. As these accounts make clear, things can look quite different from different locations in the same movement.

    Helen Kennedy works in a subsidized-housing community center for the Toronto Parks and Recreation Department, where she is a coordinator of the At Risk Rescue program. She works with poor families, and particularly with youth of color from the Caribbean and East Africa. She belongs to CUPE Local 79, which represents Toronto city workers, serves on the executive of the Toronto and York Region Labour Council, and is also secretary of CUPE’s Toronto District Council.

    “During the Toronto Day of Action,” says Kennedy, “I was very involved in my own district, North York. Just after Mike Harris was elected, we created a grassroots organization that brought together both community and labor organizations, the North York Fight Back coalition. We didn’t have funding from anybody. We went to community organization meetings where we explained what was happening to the budget and funding for social programs. And we organized our own information meetings where we explained the 22 percent cut to welfare. We grew to become a much larger organization reaching across the whole community.

    “The big difference between what we did and what René Fortin did was that they had tons of money, and they had 75 activists that were paid for organizing. In North York we weren’t getting paid, and the people from the unions who were involved were known as community activists.

    “The day of the work stoppage, we connected with the larger groups and arranged cross-picketing. We had busloads of community people coming in to picket as well. One of my most favorite memories was seeing two busloads of seniors from the Lawrence Heights community. It was amazing to see all these community members coming in to join the picket lines.

    “There were a lot of teachers involved as well–from primary and secondary–and students, and we ended up having 5,000 people out in the Valley of North York, a suburb of the north end of Toronto, which was the largest rally in North York’s history.”


    Helen Kennedy offers these suggestions for building a labor-community coalition:

    Go slow: Understand that it takes a lot of time to build coalitions; it cannot be done too quickly. Don’t go faster than the group is going. It has always been one of my personal problems, I know where I want to go and I want people to go with me. The group has to move all at the same time.
    Stick to the common goal: One of the problems is that you get sidetracked into other issues, which may be very key issues, but that could put you in danger of not bringing the coalition forward. You have to decide what issues can be dealt with in terms of a consensus. A coalition does not have to take a position on every issue.
    Reflect the diversity of your community: We did a lot of work in the poorer neighborhoods to get the people that were most affected by the cuts. In a city like Toronto with large immigrant populations, you have many different languages such as Farsi, Tigrina, Amharic, Chinese, Vietnamese. You have to be able to communicate with people. Providing meals may be important, or providing childcare. We also worked to bring in women through the North York Women’s Center.
    Create balance in the coalition: There are totally different ways of organizing. How you organize in the union may not be how you organize in the community. When you get both groups together there has to be balance. It’s not just having co-chairs that’s important, it’s having co-power. Labor came in with the financial power, they had all the money, and they had the staff, organizers.


    “In Toronto we put together a group of rank and filers on a coordinating committee,” says Fortin, “and I was the staff person in charge of coordination. We had about a dozen members from all sectors and it was a diverse group in every way.”

    CUPE’s plan was to shut down about 100 different institutions and facilities, everything but hospitals, for which special arrangements were made. Before the Days of Action began, Fortin and other union leaders met with management to negotiate no-reprisal agreements to protect striking workers.

    Fortin remembers, “We said to them, ‘We’re shutting down your place.’ They said, ‘That’s illegal.’ We said, ‘Well, we feel it’s legal.’

    “We negotiated ‘no reprisal, no disciplinary action’ agreements with most of the employers.” Those agreements were possible because the funding cuts were affecting the agency managers too.

    Organizing any strike, but particularly a general strike of an entire metropolitan area, requires detailed planning of every aspect of the event.

    “We had our map,” says Fortin, “and we had located all the facilities, but we had to make sure there were people able to be on all those picket lines for the day. We had to insure that–where there were multiple entrances–they had all entrances covered. We wanted to make sure nobody would go in to work. So we had to have training for picket captains, and a communication system to communicate directly about hot spots.

    “We developed a protocol for picket captains, so that people would know their rights, and to insure the people on the line were orderly. You have to understand that we had people who were quite aggressive, and that not everybody was sympathetic to us. So we had to have contacts for the picket captains, for when problems occurred. We had to have people with experience in the neighborhood to assist them,” says Fortin.

    In addition to meeting with the employers, the union leaders also met with the police in advance of the demonstrations. “We had a series of meetings with the police, giving them a heads-up as to our intentions. We established members to be in charge of contacts with the police.”

    “This was a hand-in-hand situation with the community groups,” says Fortin. “We had co-chairs, and we were joined at the hip. So all of our actions were joint actions. The community groups appreciated the unions’ organization, and they had a sense of empowerment collectively. Community groups don’t have a centralized organization like the labor movement does, and they don’t have the funds, and they appreciated the power, and economic base.”

    Communications with union members, the communities, the public, and the press was an important job. “We had three staff people assigned to press, communications, publications, translation of documents,” says Fortin. “Since the city is highly multicultural, we produced literature in 18 different languages, which is only some of the 146 different languages spoken in Toronto. We dealt with the major ones, French, Cantonese, and sixteen others.”

    Press coverage came almost automatically because of the significance of such a shutdown. “We were in the press everyday. The Day of Action became the issue. We were in all forms of media.”

    The event had to be built in various ways. “We planned for particular activities for the different sectors,” says Fortin. “A demonstration to protest the impact on education, another to protest the impact on social services. So there was a special day for each group, with massive demonstrations leading up to the Day of Action. So it was not only a one-day event.

    “At the same time that we were mobilizing Toronto, we were also mobilizing the rest of the province for people to come to Toronto. So we needed a whole transportation network to insure that others could get to Toronto on that day, and mobilization in every other community.

    “The respective unions also had their own events. CUPE has about 145,000 members in Toronto alone. We decided, ‘Here’s 100 or 111 places we want to shut down.’ Then we began to plan for the day itself: what do you do with thousands of people in a particular area? Community groups and unions formed committees, such as an entertainment committee or a transportation group.

    “We had a plan to shut down major highways on that day, in and around Toronto, a city of about two million. Our plan was to stretch cars across the freeways and just drive at a slow rate, causing traffic congestion. So we had people get up at 5 o’clock in the morning to set up those barriers. But on that day, everybody decided to stay home, because the subway was going to close down, and people presumed there would be major havoc on the roads, so when we got there in the morning the highways were deserted. Our cars traveling at a slow speed got pulled over by the police. Toronto was a ghost town, nobody came that day.

    “On October 25, Toronto’s Day of Action, we began to close things down at 5 o’clock in the morning. We set up our picket lines. Our people shut down the landfill sites, social services, City Hall, the Hydroelectric Commission (power facilities), and school boards. We didn’t picket the schools, but rather the administration, though there was no school on that day. Effectively everything was shut tight. There was some administration staff that got in, but as far as business as usual—nothing.”

    Did the strike remain peaceful? “There were minor incidents,” says Fortin. “Minor violence on the subway spots. At landfill sites. Some of our people were becoming quite aggressive. Such minor events were to be expected, but there was nothing of a major consequence. Was there intimidation? Sure. When you see a policeman on a mounted horse, that itself was intimidating. But there were no police incidents.

    “We made it clear our intention was not to rip down buildings, we wanted to express our opinion. We had marshals for the parades, and all those advance things. We were prepared for anything.

    “So on that day, all these buses came rolling into Toronto to get ready for the parade at exhibition grounds on the lakeshore, which was the congregating point. Then we marched up to the legislature. Along the route we had entertainment and speakers. At the parade people had their colors representing their unions and community groups. Community groups put on theatrical skits. We went along this massive five-kilometer route. Tens of thousands of people, with a sea of flags. It’s great fun to be in that type of a crowd. Top-name artists playing, speakers from the labor and community groups and opposition political parties.

    “We calculated 250,000 people at the parade on the Day of Action. It reminded me of the ’60s. It was great. And it was the result of all the legwork, the union and community meetings, and the acquiescence in terms of employer retribution.”

    “Toronto is mostly a financial and service place, and most of the strikers were public sector workers,” says Herman Rosenfeld. “Many activists were recruited to picket transit maintenance yards and entrances, and the financial district. There was little work on the inside in these workplaces. There weren’t huge numbers of private sector workplaces left to close down.”

    The organization of the Days of Action shut down one city after another in Ontario in 1996, 1997, and 1998. What does it take to organize such a massive movement?

    Clearly, a citywide general strike requires hundreds of people prepared to take responsibility for organizing thousands of others to carry out the strike and the related marches and demonstrations. Almost nothing in such an undertaking can be left to chance. The list below barely begins to convey the many varied elements involved in such a strike:

    A sense of crisis and urgency: The Days of Action were precipitated by a political crisis, a frontal attack on unions and the poor by a Conservative government. It was important that unions and many social movements and community organizations perceived that they were under an unusually fierce attack that required an extraordinary response.
    The support of official labor bodies: The Ontario Federation of Labour, representing most of the province’s unions, passed a resolution to support the Days of Action. While some unions gave only nominal support, the resolution was important in authorizing the strike, making it “official.”
    The endorsement and support of local labor leaders and rank-and-file members: The strike could only be successful with their commitment to making it happen.
    A core of dedicated activists: These people brought the message to co-workers, within and across unions and, if necessary, past leaders who were opposed or ambivalent.
    An alliance between labor, social movements, and community groups: These alliances gave the movement a greater social base and greater mobilizing power. As one official said, “We were joined at the hip,” throughout the Days of Action.
    The creation of a “general staff” for organizing and running the strike: The general staff must be large enough to reflect the leadership of the organizations involved, and small enough to effectively engage in rapid discussion and decision-making when necessary. The general staff has to be responsible to the unions that have authorized the strike, to the rank and file involved, and also to the communities that will be affected. The general staff must plan and oversee the strike, handle negotiations with authorities, and respond to emergencies.
    A detailed plan: The plan of action should include: a) a list of all the workplaces to be closed; b) a list, for each location, of all entrances and exits to be covered; c) a general map of all the facilities to be closed, and specific maps for each location; d) a timeline for the closing of workplaces, with plans to mobilize pickets for each hour and each day; e) listings of picket captains and their contact information.
    The assignment and training of picket captains and pickets: Picket captains need to be trusted, reliable, capable people who will take responsibility for closing down locations, dealing with authorities at the local level, maintaining discipline of the picketers, and enforcing the strike on those who attempt to violate it. Picket captains need to understand the strike’s “rules of engagement.” The strike may be peaceful, involve the use of civil disobedience, involve the use of force, or involve seizure of property. In the case of the Days of Action, the rules were to maintain peaceful picket lines and enforce the strike. But in other situations, different rules may apply.
    The training of pickets: Picketers need to know exactly what they are supposed to do, where and for how long, and to whom they are to turn over responsibility when their shift ends. Typically, strike rules include: assigned hours of duty, assigned equipment (bullhorns, picket signs, armbands, ropes or tape to indicate off-limits areas), rules of behavior (no drinking, no drugs, no swearing or abusive language), rules of engagement with those who attempt to violate the picket line (shouted slogans, locked arms, physical isolation and removal, use of limited force, etc.).
    Media team: Media spokespeople have a sensitive job, since their statements establish in the mind of the public—including the employers and the government–the reason for the strike, its character, its objectives, and its methods.
    Internal communications team: In the lead-up to the strike and on the days of the strike, the team needs to constantly produce information for strike captains, picketers, union and community organization members, and the general public, possibly in several languages.
    Emergency medical services: In any large gathering of people, there will almost always be health problems, and doctors, nurses, and other health professionals strike should be organized into teams identifiable to the public and the police, and linked to picket captains.
    Transportation or logistics team: In a strike like the Toronto Day of Action that brought thousands of other Ontario residents into the city, a committee must arrange transportation, overnight shelter, and food (whether through prepared meals or simply directing people to restaurants).
    Liaison with employers: The general staff needs to negotiate with employers over maintenance of essential services, such as emergency rooms, ongoing patient care, and hazardous operations such as chemical and nuclear plants. Leaders should also try to negotiate no-retribution agreements.
    Liaison with police: The general staff needs to inform the police of plans, to avoid unnecessary conflict and confrontation. Strike leaders may also want to meet with leaders of the police union. The general staff should be able to communicate instantly with police commanders during the strike, to deal with emergencies and, if possible, ward off repression.
    Strike day operations team: This team oversees picket captains, picket lines, and related activities to make sure that they happen as planned, and to deal with contingencies and emergencies.
    March or rally team: The march route needs to be carefully examined and worked out in detail with the police and other authorities. Entertainment needs to be organized, and making the speakers list will likely be a politically sensitive task.
    Negotiation committee: If the strike has a particular political objective, and will continue until there is some sort of resolution of the issue, a negotiation team will have to deal with the relevant authorities. It should made up of the central leaders of the bodies that authorized the strike. The negotiators will coordinate with the general staff and the media and communications teams to keep the picket captains and picketers informed of developments.

Leave a reply

You must be logged in to post a comment.